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Priscilla A. Hayden-Roy 
TILL EULENSPIEGEL’S TRANSGRESSIONS AGAINST 
CONVENTION: INTERPRETING THE PARASITE 
With Peter Honegger’s1 discovery in 1971 that the Brunswickian tax col-
lector, Hermann Bote, was the author of Till Eulenspiegel (TE), literary 
research was able to situate the chapbook in a more accurate and specifi c 
context than had previously been possible. Bote’s other works, along 
with what we know of his life, indicate that he was a strong supporter 
of the Hanseatic cities and the ruling patriciate, that he opposed the po-
litical uprisings of the guildsmen as he experienced them in Brunswick, 
and that he espoused a view of corporate unity within the city through 
the perpetuation of the estates.2 Many literary critics have concluded 
1. Peter Honegger: Ulenspiegel. Ein Beitrag zur Druckgeschichte und zu Ver-
fasserfrage. Neumünster 1973. In 1971 Honegger presented his fi ndings at the 
annual meeting of the Niederdeutscher Sprachverein in Hildesheim. (See Her-
men Bote. Bilanz und Perspektiven der Forschung. Beiträge zum Hermen-Bote-
Kolloquium vom 3. Oktober 1981 in Braun schweig. Ed. Herbert Blume, Wer-
ner Wunderlich. Göppingen 1982, pp. 3–11, here p. 4.) 
2. What belongs to Hermann Bote’s oeuvre is still a matter of debate among 
literary critics. See the bibliography of Bote’s works compiled by Detlev Schött-
ker and Werner Wunderlich (In: Hermen Bote, p. 135-139). Bernd-Ulrich 
Hucker (Bote, Hermen. In: Lexikon des Mittelalters. Vol. 2. Munich, Zurich 
1983, cols. 482-484) presents a dissenting view of what constitutes Bote’s oeu-
vre. For biographical essays on Bote, see Wolfgang Lindow: Herman Bote — 
Leben und Werk. Eine Einführung. In: Hermen Bote, p. 3-11; Gerhard Cordes: 
Bote, Hermen (Hermann). In: Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfas-
serlexikon. 2nd ed. Vol. 1. Berlin, NY 1978, col. 967-970; George C. School-
fi eld: Hermann Bote. An Introductory Essay. In: German Studies in Honor of 
Otto Springer. Ed. Stephen J. Kaplowitt. Pittsburg 1978, p. 281-303. The study 
of Bote’s social and political views opens onto the history of early modern
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that with TE Hermann Bote wished to exhort, albeit in an entertaining 
manner, members of his society to beware of the forces threatening to 
destroy its all too fragile order.3 This appears to undercut the validity of 
interpretations of Till as a plebian folk hero, or even a proto-proletar-
ian revolutionary force.4 While the text itself can be construed to por-
tray Till as a positive hero or an emancipatory force, authorial intention 
____________
Brunswick. See Max L. Baeumer: “Ohn Tumult/ ohn Schwermerey”: Liter-
arische Evidenz zum ‘revolutionären’ Charakter der Reformation in Braun-
schweig. In: Wolfenbütteler Beiträge 4 (1981), p. 59-1 10; Olaf Mörke: Rat und 
Bürger in der Reformation. Soziale Gruppen und kirchlicher Wandel in den 
welfi schen Hansestädten Luneburg, Braunschweig und Göttingen. Hildesheim 
1983. Mörke (esp. p. 79-85) questions some of the fi ndings of the earlier study 
by Werner Spieß: Geschichte der Stadt Braunschweig im Mittelalter. Vom 
Ausgang des Mittelalters bis zum Ende der Stadtfreiheit (1491-1671). Braun-
schweig 1966. 
3. See, for example, Werner Wunderlich: Einleitung. In: Eulenspiegel- In-
terpretationen. Der Schalk im Spiegel der Forschung 1807-1977. Ed. Werner 
Wunderlich. Munich 1979, pp. 7-14, here p. 11; Hans Wiswe: Sozialgeschich-
tliches um Till Eulenspiegel 11. Eine Nachlese. In: Eulen- spiegel-Interpreta-
tionen, pp. 175-18 1, here p. 179; Max L. Baeumer: Die sozialen Verhältnisse 
und der sozialkritische Charakter der Volksliteratur im braunschweigischen 
Raum mr Zeit des ‘Dyl Vlenspiegel’. In: Eulenspiegel-Jahrbuch (1985), pp. 
33-47, esp. p. 38, 39, 46-47. 
4. See, for example, Ingeborg Spriewald: Vom ‘Eulenspiegel’ zum ‘Sim-
plizissimus’. Zur Genese des Realismus in den Anfängen der deutschen Pro-
saerzählung. Berlin 1974. Spriewald fi nds in the chapbook a “Grundlinie des 
Opponierens und sozialen Protests” (p. 57) directed against “Obrigkeit und 
ständische Beengung” (p. 94). An interesting attempt to maintain the valid-
ity of authorial intention, while at the same time legitimating a view of Till as 
“Held der kleinen Leute” is found in Georg Bollenbeck: Till Eulenspiegel. Der 
dauerhafte Schwankheld. Zum Verhältnis von Produktions- und Rezeptionsge-
schichte. Stuttgart 1985. Bollenbeck claims that Bote’s subject material turned 
itself against his intentions: “Eulenspiegel ist für den traditionsorientierten 
Zollschreiber akzeptabel,weil er als Außenstehender das morsche Ständegerüst 
scheinbar nicht gefährdet, er kann aber gerade deshalb, und dies widerspricht 
Botes Konzept, dessen Unterminierung aufzeigen.” (p. 66) Thus he maintains 
that the reception history of TE provides just as valid interpretations of the 
work as authorial intention does. 
rules that Bote would not have wanted to sow the seeds of discontent 
and rebellion among the lower classes with his socially displaced, itin-
erant prankster. If we raise the question of the book’s reception in the 
16th century, evidence indicates that our postulated authorial intention 
was communicated quite successfully to the chapbook’s readership.5 
Contemporary adaptations of TE by Hans Sachs and Fischart, for ex-
ample, exploit the chapbook’s moralizing, didactic potential.6 On the 
other hand, we also know that TE was placed on the index of forbidden 
books in 1569 published in Antwerp by the Duke of Alba in the name 
of Emperor Philipp II.7 This suggests that some authorities in the 16th 
century may have perceived the work to be seditious, although this cer-
tainly was not the author’s intention. 
This brings us to a fundamental interpretative question: does autho-
rial intention determine the meaning of a text? The school of pragmatic 
linguistics known as speech act theory (SAT) is generally the fi rst cited 
in defense of authorial intention. While initially developed to analyze 
spoken communication, John R. Searle8 has argued that the same prin-
ciple obtains for fi ctional discourse: fi ction is a sort of “pretended” dis-
course, he says, and “pretend” is an intentional verb. Thus the whole 
work of fi ction derives from the author’s intention to engage in this 
form of discourse. But the status of authorial intention has come under 
fi re of late, particularly from the deconstructionists. The disagreement 
was fi rst articulated in a debate between Jacques Derrida and John R. 
Searle, which was published in the fi rst two issues of Glyph.9 
5. Bollenbeck: Till Eulenspiegel, p. 170-203. 
6. Ibid., 192-198. 
7. Ibid., 201; Honegger: Ulenspiegel, p. 57 ff. 
8. John R. Searle: The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse. In: John R. 
Searle: Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts. London, 
NY 1979, p. 58-75. 
9. Jacques Derrida: Signature Event Context. In: Glyph. John Hop- kins Tex-
tual Studies 1 (1977), pp. 172-197; John R. Searle: Reiterating the Differences. A 
Reply to Derrida. In: Glyph 1 (1977), p. 198-208; Jacques Derrida: Limited Inc 
a b c . . . In: Glyph 2 (1977), p. 162-254. See also Manfred Frank: Die Entro-
pie der Sprache. Überlegungen zur Debatte Searle-Derrida. In: Manfred Frank: 
Das Sagbare und das Unsagbare. 
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Derrida’s article “Signature Event Context”, originally presented as a 
lecture in 1971 at the Congrès international des Sociétés de philosophie 
de langue française in Montreal, initiated the debate. In this article 
Derrida calls into question the notion of context as a rigorous, scientifi c 
concept able to determine meaning. The empirical saturation of con-
text is rendered impossible, he argues, by the very nature of commu-
nication, which depends on the iterability of its signs. Speaker inten-
tion is equally unable to provide an anchoring context. Here he takes 
issue with the “father” of SAT, John Austin, who in his seminal How To 
Do Things With Words10 excludes “non-serious” or “parasitic” language 
from his discussion of “ordinary” language, specifi cally the speech act 
he calls the “performative”. The passage under question reads: 
As utterances our performatives are also heir to certain other kinds of ill 
which infect all utterances. And these likewise, though again they might 
be brought into a more general account, we are deliberately at present ex-
cluding. I mean, for example, the following: a performative utterance will, 
for example, be in a peculiar way hollow and void if said by an actor on 
the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy. This applies 
in a similar manner to any and every utterance — a sea-change in special 
circumstances. Language in such circumstances is in special ways — intel-
ligibly — used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use — 
ways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations of language. All this 
we are excluding from consideration. Our performative utterances, felici-
tous or not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary circumstances.11 
Derrida objects that what Austin has excluded “as anomaly, exception, 
‘non-serious,’ citation . . . is the determined modifi cation of a general ci-
tationality — or rather, a general iterability — without which there would
____________
Studien zur neuesten französischen Hermeneutik und Texttheorie. Frankfurt/
M. 1980, p. 141-210; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: Revolutions that as Yet Have 
No Model. Derrida’s Limited Inc. In: Diacritics 10 (December 1980), p. 29-49; 
Stanley E. Fish: With the Compliments of the Author. Refl ections on Austin and 
Derrida. In: Critical Inquiry 8 (Summer 1982), p. 693-721. 
10. J. L. Austin: How to Do Things with Words. J.O. Urmson, Marina Sbisa, 
eds. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass. 1975. 
11. Ibid, p. 21 f. 
not even be a ‘successful’ performative.”12 He grants that while there is a 
“relative specifi city” of performatives determined by speaker intention, a 
“structural unconsciousness . . . prohibits any saturation of the context.”13 
Searle responded in a brief article entitled, “Reiterating the Differ-
ences: A Reply to Derrida”.14 He upholds Austin’s distinction between 
“ordinary” and “parasitic” discourse as valid: “We do not, for exam-
ple, hold the actor responsible today for the promise he made on stage 
last night in the way that we normally hold people responsible for their 
promises.”15 And he defends Austin’s exclusion as merely a “research 
strategy”, arguing that ordinary language is “logically prior” to para-
sitic language, and that “relatively simpler problems” are justifi ably the 
starting point for a “general theory of speech acts”.16 To Derrida’s de-
nial that intention can “never be through and through present to itself 
and to its context”,17 Searle counters: “In serious literal speech the sen-
tences are precisely the realizations of the intentions: there need be no 
gulf at all between illocutionary intention and its expression. The sen-
tences are, so to speak, fungible intentions.”18 
In another essay devoted to the “logical status of fi ctional discourse”, 
Searle maintains that the work of fi ction as a whole is a serious ut-
terance: it conveys a serious “message or messages” through the per-
formance of the pretended speech acts. These messages, he says, are 
conveyed “by the text but are not in the text”, except in the case of “tire-
somely didactic authors”.19 Thus a “serious” message, not necessarily 
explicit within the fi ctional text, is communicated by “non-serious” or 
parasitic language. According to SAT, the interpreter must consider au-
thorial intention in order to distill the serious message which anchors 
the text’s meaning. 
12. Derrida: Signature Event Context, p. 191. 
13. Ibid., p. 192. 
14. See note 9. 
15. Searle: Reply, p. 204. 
16. Ibid., p. 205. 
17. Derrida: Signature Event Context, p. 192. 
18. Searle: Reply, p. 202. 
19. Searle: The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse, p. 74. 
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But in the case of Bote’s TE, we are confronted with an array of prob-
lems that call to mind Derrida’s objections to authorial intention as the 
determinant of meaning. The work immediately confronts us with ma-
neuvers that Bote employed to defer his liability for the authorship of 
the work. First, he published it anonymously, hiding his identity in an 
acrostic that, as it turned out, would be overlooked for 460 years. Sec-
ond, in the foreword the anonymous author, calling himself “N”, fur-
ther distanced the work from himself by placing the ground of its origin 
on other anonymous persons: in 1500, he says, “etlich Personen” asked 
him to collect the materials on the “behend listiger und durchtribener 
. . . Buren Sun . . . genant Dil Ulenspiegel”.20 So Herman Bote was not 
properly responsible for the work? But then a third problem surfaces: 
the “seriousness” of Bote’s anonymous deferral itself becomes ques-
tionable when we consider that he was citing a standard literary form; 
moreover John L. Flood recently uncovered a specifi c source for Bote’s 
introduction in the introduction to Wigoleis vom Rade.21 Bote’s deferral 
itself is a non-serious citation, so that we are uncertain whether we are, 
by means of a double negation, deferred back to authorial intention, 
or removed a step further from it. Finally, the anonymous author pur-
ports that the work serves nothing other than a non-serious purpose: 
“Nun allein umb ein frölich Gemüt zu machen in schweren Zeiten, und 
die Lesenden und Zuhörenden mögen gute kurtzweilige Fröden und 
Schwänck daruß fabulleren.”22 The author wishes to prevent his book 
from being attached to any program other than entertainment; he spe-
cifi cally denies that the book was written to annoy or criticize anybody. 
If we assume for the moment that Bote’s maneuvers in the foreword 
serve as a sort of mask, behind which he hid his own identity and his 
“real” authorial intention (which for reasons we will consider later, he 
considered prudent to obscure), the next step would be to consider the
20. Ein kurtzweilig Lesen von Dil Ulenspiegel. Wolfgang Lindow, ed. Stutt-
gart 1978,p. 7. 
21. John L. Flood: Der Prosaroman ‘Wigoleis vom Rade’ und die Entstehung 
des ‘Ulenspiegel’. In: Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur 
105 (1976), p. 151-165.  
22. Dil Ulenspiegel, p. 7. 
Till episodes themselves. We will see in the following discussion how an 
analysis based on SAT yields an interpretation in agreement with what 
we posited as Bote’s likely authorial intention, as extrapolated from his 
other writings. But we will also see that the means by which Bote chose 
to exhort his society — the social outcast and parasite who transgresses 
against the whole spectrum of medieval society — yields alternative in-
terpretations when the pranks, the parasitic or non-serious language of 
the outcast, are taken seriously. 
Before we continue with these analyses, one more observation should 
be made concerning the debate between Derrida and Searle. Derrida re-
sponded to Searle’s “Reply” in a lengthy second essay, “Limited Inc a b 
c ...”,23 in which he puts forward an “ethico-political” critique of speech 
act theory. He questions Searle’s insistence that the terms “parasitic”, 
“non-serious”, “infelicitous”, “impure”, etc., employed by Austin are 
properly theoretical, or that they merely signify “logical dependence”.24 
Derrida sees in this moral terminology an “ethico-political language”25 
that exposes the ideological foundations of SAT: 
I am convinced that speech act theory is fundamentally . . . a theory of 
right or law, of convention, of political ethics or of politics as ethics. It de-
scribes . . . the pure conditions of an ethical-political discourse insofar as 
this discourse involves the relation of intentionality to conventionality or 
to rules . . . [T]his “theory” is compelled to reproduce, to reduplicate in it-
self the law of its object or its object as law; it must submit to the norm it 
purports to analyze. Hence, both its fundamental, intrinsic moralism and 
its irreducible empiricism.26 
The distinction between “serious” and “non-serious” or “ordinary” lan-
guage inevitably becomes political, insofar as the conventions defi ning 
“normalcy” are entrenched in social relationships of power. SAT desig-
nates as “pure”, “felicitous”, etc. only those speech acts which conform 
to the rules governing “right” conventional discourse. Derrida’s notion 
of iterability, on the other hand, makes transgression against convention
23. See note 9. 
24. Derrida: Limited Inc, p. 234 f. 
25. Ibid., p. 240. 
26. Ibid., p. 240. 
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a fundamental possibility of language: “Once this parasitism or fi ction-
ality can always add another parasitic or fi ctional structure to what-
ever has preceded it . . . everything becomes possible against the lan-
guage-police; for example ‘literatures’ or ‘revolutions’ that as yet have 
no Context and intention do indeed relatively specify the meaning of an 
utterance, but they cannot “govern the entire scene and system of ut-
terance”.28 Convention bolstered by the force of social relationships of 
power enforces a “normal” meaning and banishes the unconventional 
meaning as “fi ction”. But this policing of language cannot guarantee 
“pure” speech acts. It is constantly under siege: 
If the police is always waiting in the wings, it is because conventions are 
by essence violable and precarious, in themselves and by the fi ctional-
ity that constitutes them, even before there has been any overt trans-
gression . . . 29
This quotation brings us to the topic of this paper, the proper interpre-
tation of transgression in Hermann Bote’s TE. Should we understand 
Till’s transgressions against society as an admonition to protect an all 
too precarious social order? Or can they be construed positively as a rel-
ativizer of social norms, insofar as they expose the violability of the sta-
tus quo? SAT and deconstruction in competition with each other pro-
vide a useful heuristic device in understanding how Till’s transgressions 
generate opposing interpretations. 
In his chapbook Bote portrays a broad spectrum of representatives 
of society, from poor to rich, artisans, nobility, ecclesiastical fi gures, 
and their interaction with Till, a socially marginalized vagrant, a Gouck-
ler and Spilman. On the one hand we fi nd the “inside” group protected 
by convention and occupying a position within the community; on the 
other hand, the outsider, the “non-serious” prankster, who survives 
“parasitically” by masking himself as a member of the “inside” group, 
only to be banished once his pranks expose him as a fraud. As a vagrant 
27. Ibid., p. 243. 
28. Derrida: Signature Event Context, p. 192. 
29. Derrida: Limited Inc, p. 250. 
and Gouckler Till belonged to the socially declassed group of the dis-
honorable” (unehrliche Leute). The dishonorable and their progeny 
were denied membership in the guilds; they could not be legal heirs 
or guardians; they could not prosecute; they could not take oaths, and 
thus could prove their innocence only by ordeal. Their ranks included 
a surprisingly large spectrum of people: gravediggers, executioners, 
knackers, nightwatchmen, bathhouse overseers, barbers, millers, weav-
ers, and shepherds.30 Hermann Bote accentuated the tabu against Till 
even further by designating him a “Schalck”. Hans Wiswe has observed 
that the term had a considerably more pejorative meaning at the close 
of the Middle Ages than we fi nd even by the eighteenth century.31 Lu-
ther translates the polluti in the Vulgate (Jer. 23: 1 1) as Schelke, and 
the serve nequam of Matth. 18:32 as Schalkknecht.32 In his Schicht-
boik Bote himself refers to those instigating the guildsmen’s uprising 
as Schelke.33 The drastic discrepancy of social status between the ac-
tors in TE sets the stage for a confrontation between conventional lan-
guage (as represented by the members of “proper” society) and a lan-
guage of transgression (necessarily so, since Till intrudes into a space 
not proper to himself when he speaks). These confrontations typically 
occur when Till has been given a command by someone exercising au-
thority over him. Such a situation is not infrequent, as Till often hires 
himself out to an artisan, in order to live “parasitically” for a few days 
under the guise of an apprentice or helper. The smooth functioning of 
the artisan’s shop is dependent fi rst upon the recognition of the mas-
ter’s authority, and second upon linguistic convention, by which the 
artisan’s commands are expressed, understood and carried out. Till vi-
olates the relationship between himself and his master by sidestepping 
the conventional meaning of the command and “obeying” a non-con-
ventional meaning. 
30. Werner Danckert: Unehrliche Leute. Die verfemten Berufe. Berne, Mu-
nich 1963,esp. p. 9-20. 
31. Hans Wiswe: Sozialgeschichtliches um Till Eulenspiegel 11, p. 176 f. 
32. Ibid., p. 177f. 
33. Werner Wunderlich (“Till Eulenspiegel”. Munich 1984, p. 28) lists sev-
eral examples of Bote’s use of schalk in the Schichtboik. 
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A typical example is found in the 20th episode, where Till hires him-
self out to a baker in Uelzen. The baker orders Till to sift fl our dur-
ing the night while the baker sleeps. According to Bollenbeck, order-
ing one’s help to work unsupervised violated traditional guild law.34 
Till fi nds himself in this situation in many episodes,35 and it uniformly 
provides him the opportunity to execute a prank. In light of Bollen-
beck’s observation, the punitive or vengeful function of the prank be-
comes clearer: with it Bote can warn contemporary artisans to uphold 
the traditional corporative ideal of work. In this episode Till lays a lin-
guistic trap for the baker by protesting that he will need a light in order 
to obey his master’s order. His master refuses to give him one; he will 
have to sift by the moonlight as the previous help has done. Till com-
plies, “Hon sie dann also hin gebütlet, so wil ich es auch tun.”36 While 
the baker sleeps, Till holds the sifter out the window of the bakery, 
letting the fl our fall in the moonlight onto the dirt courtyard. Several 
hours later the baker discovers his courtyard white with fl our. “Waz 
der Tüffel! Waz machst du hie? Hat daz Mel nit mer kostet, wann daz 
du dez in den Treck bütelest?’he yells. Till responds innocently: “Hon 
Ihr mich es nit geheissen in dem Mon bütelen sunder Liecht? Also 
hab ich gethon.”37 The conventionally defi ned relationship of master 
to servant establishes the framework within which the utterances be-
tween Till and the baker are exchanged. The nature of their speech 
acts buttresses this relationship: the master gives directives, and the 
34. “Zwar dingt in der Regel bis weit ins 15. Jahrhundert der Meister die 
gesamte Arbeitskraft des Gesellen, zwar kann die Arbeitszeit bis zu 16 Stun-
den dauern, doch halten Meister und Geselle die gleiche Arbeitszeit ein und 
bilden eine Werkgemeinschaft.” (Bollenbeck: Till Eulenspiegel, p. 104.) 
Bollenbeck maintains that these episodes demonstrate a pervasive disin-
tegration of a corporative means of production, symptomatic of the chang-
ing economic relationships in the late medievaL/early modern period. 
35. See episodes 20, 39, 47, 48, 56, 62 (also cited in Bollenbeck: Till Eulen-
spiegel, p. 104). 
36. Dil Ulenspiegel, p. 61. 
37. Ibid., p. 61. 
servant promises to fulfi ll them. Let us examine these speech acts, us-
ing Searle’s taxonomy.38 
The directive given by the baker to sift fl our in the moonlight fi ts the 
following formula: 
! ↑ W (H does A) 
! =  illocutionary point, in this case an attempt by the speaker to get 
the hearer to do something. This will be the typical initial con-
stellation between master (speaker) and servant (hearer). 
↑ =  “direction of fi t” — an upturned arrow indicates the world should 
be made to fi t the words (as opposed to a declaration, where the 
direction of fi t is words to world [↓]).In our case the world within 
the master’s workplace is to be made congruent to the master’s 
word: the bags of unsifted fl our shall be fi tted to the master’s 
words, “Sift the fl our”. 
W =  the sincerity condition which indicates the psychological state of 
the speaker. In this case the sincerity condition is Want — the 
master wants the fl our to be sifted. 
(H does A) = the propositional content, or the actual task to be per-
formed by the hearer. In this case, “Till sifts the fl our in the 
moonlight”, is the propositional content of the directive. 
According to this formula the directive is broadly defi ned to include a 
spectrum ranging from ordering, to asking, to entreating.39 Searle spec-
ifi es within this spectrum by defi ning additional dimensions of varia-
tion, including that of social status differences between speaker and 
hearer. He observes that this variation determines whether the asking 
is a command (which presupposes a relationship of power/authority of 
speaker over hearer) or a request (which may well indicate the speak-
er’s lack of power/authority over against the hearer).40 This restriction 
is of utmost importance in the linguistic relationship between Till and 
the master artisan, for by it the perlocutionary force of the statement
38. John R. Searle: A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts. In: Searle: Expression 
and Meaning, p. 1-29, esp. p. 12-15. 
39. Ibid., p. 14. 
40. Ibid., p. 5 f. 
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is socially legitimated. The hearer is bound to perform the command 
in order to receive from the speaker the material benefi ts upon which 
his (the hearer’s) existence depends. The linguistic convention “master-
commands-servant” is rooted in the socio-economic relationship be-
tween them and serves to perpetuate it. The only acceptable response to 
the command is the promise to obey, which alone guarantees the felic-
ity of the master’s statement. 
Searle’s taxonomy of the promise (commissive)41  will make clear 
what exactly the relationship between the baker’s command and Till’s 
promise is. The promise formula is as follows: 
C ↓ I (S does A) 
C =  the illocutionary point which commits the speaker to some fu-
ture course of action. In our case Till (now the speaker) commits 
himself to the fulfi llment of the baker’s command. Note again 
the signifi cance of social status in this promise: Till’s commit-
ment is not autonomous or sovereign; it is a function of the com-
mand, the only response that can guarantee the felicity of the 
command. 
↑ =  again the direction of fi t is world to words. However, now the 
speaker of the promise is also to be the agent of change. 
I =  the sincerity condition of the speaker of the promise is Intention: 
in our case Till indicates by the promise that he intends to per-
form the action described in the baker’s command. 
(S does A) =the propositional content of the promise: the speaker shall 
perform some future action “A”. This action “A” must be identi-
cal to that stated in the master’s command. 
The servant’s promise to obey his master’s command is highly re-
stricted. The illocutionary point of the utterance commits Till to what 
his position as servant compels him to do, i.e. obey his master. The 
propositional content of the promise is merely a repetition42 of that of 
the master’s command, spoken now from the agent’s point of view. The 
41. Ibid., p. 14f. 
42. As we will see, herein lies the problem in the Till episode: for although
promise uttered in response to the master’s command linguistically 
mirrors the social relationship between master and servant, where the 
servant is an extension and realizer of the master’s will. 
But obviously Till did not carry out the command as intended; the 
exchange of speech acts was, in the view of SAT, “infelicitous” or “de-
fective”. In his Speech Acts Searle outlines the “necessary and suffi cient 
conditions for the act of promising to have been 
____________
he repeats the baker’s command, he means something other than what the 
baker did. Here, too, lies a point of difference between Searle and Derrida. Der-
rida denies the possibility of any “pure” repetition with his notion of iterability: 
“Iterability supposes a minimal remainder (as well as a minimum of idealiza-
tion) in order that the identity of the selfsame be repeatable and identifi able in, 
through, and even in view of its alteration. For the structure of iteration — and 
this is another of its decisive traits — implies both identity and difference. Iter-
ation in its ‘purest’ form — and it is always impure — contains in itself the dis-
crepancy of a difference that constitutes it as iteration.’’ (Derrida: Limited Inc, 
p. 190.) Searle, on the other hand, misunderstands Derrida because he equates 
iteration with repetition. In summing up what a “sympathetic reading” of Der-
rida might yield, Searle states that he has pointed out “that the possibility of 
parasitic discourse is internal to the notion of language, and that performatives 
can succeed only if the utterances are iterable, repetitions of conventional . . . 
forms. But neither of these points is in any way an objection to Austin. Indeed, 
Austin’s insistence on the conventional character of the performative utterance 
in particular and the illocutionary act in general commits him precisely to the 
view that performatives must be iterable, in the sense that any conventional 
act involves the notion of repetition of the same.” (Searle: Reply, p. 207; em-
phasis is mine.) The distinction is at its profoundest a metaphysical one: Der-
rida’s structure of iterability displaces the concept of identity that is at the base 
of any ontology. Spivak writes on this point: “One of the corollaries of the struc-
ture of alterity which is the revised version of the structure of identity is that ev-
ery repetition is an alteration. This would put into question both a transcen-
dental idealism that claims that the idea is infi nitely repeatable as the same and 
a speech act theory that bases its conclusions on intentions and contexts that 
can be defi ned and transferred within fi rm outlines. Iterability is the name of 
this corollary: every repetition is an alteration (iteration).” (Spivak: Revolutions 
that as Yet Have No Model, p. 37.) 
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successfully and non-defectively performed.”43 The fi rst criterion is that 
“normal input and output conditions obtain”. Included in this condition 
is the Austinian exclusion of “parasitic forms of communication such 
as telling jokes or acting in a play”.44 Till’s promise is disqualifi ed from 
the start, precisely because his language is parasitic; with his promise 
he is setting up the joke he wants to play on the baker. To do this he 
discovers an ambiguity in the command as the baker formulated it. To 
“sift fl our by the moonlight” can be interpreted to mean either “in the 
moonlight shining through the windows of the bakery” or “directly in 
the moonlight shining in the courtyard”. Convention and speaker inten-
tion seem to determine the context suffi ciently as to render the direc-
tive unambiguous. But as Derrida has noted, “intention cannot govern 
the entire scene and system of an utterance.”45 The strength of conven-
tional meaning obscures the denotative space lying beyond the pale of 
social convention and functions as a host, by means of which Till’s par-
asitic meaning can infect the conversation unnoticed. According to Der-
rida, the risk of this sort of “parasitism” constitutes the “internal and 
positive condition of possibility” of communication in general. More-
over, to ban this sort of parasitism to “a kind of ditch or external place 
of perditi0n”,46 as SAT would do, exposes the ideological foundation of 
this theory as merely a reproduction of the law it purports to be ana-
lyzing. Searle continues in his analysis of the promise, distinguishing it 
from a threat: 
A promise is defective if the thing promised is something the promisee 
does not want done; and it is further defective if the promisor does not 
believe the promisee wants it done, since a non-defective promise must 
be intended as a promise and not as a threat or warning.47
 
43. John R. Searle: Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. 
Cambridge 1970, p. 54. 
44. Ibid., p. 57. 
45. Derrida: Signature Event Context, p. 192. 
46. Ibid., p. 190. 
47. Searle: Speech Acts, p. 58. In his discussion of this passage Derrida em-
ploys the psychoanalytical notion of the subconscious to point out the “struc-
tural ambivalence” of every desire. (Limited Inc, p. 215 f.) 
Seen in this light, Till’s “promise” to sift fl our in the moonlight (mean-
ing onto the courtyard) was a threat rather than a promise, for clearly 
the baker did not want his supply of fl our ruined. SAT would indeed 
banish Till’s utterance into the domain of “defective” (or infelicitous) 
speech acts: fi rst, because it was a parasitic promise, and second, be-
cause it was really a threat masquerading in the linguistic trappings of 
a promise. The law of non-defective promising simply retraces conven-
tion as it is reenforced by social relationships. And just as the parasitic 
promise must be banished as “defective”, so, too, Till must be excluded 
from “proper” society. Once the baker realizes he has been duped, he 
sends Tiil away, calling him a Schalck, and thereby attributing to him 
an identity opposite to that of the moral community. An analysis of this 
episode according to SAT brings the “ethico-political” dimension of the 
theory clearly to light: linguistic transgression as SAT defi nes it goes 
hand in hand with what constitutes a transgression in the eyes of the 
law, that is, the destruction of property. SAT reproduces in itself laws of 
power and property that govern society and language. 
If we leave the internal fi ctional world of TE for a moment and con-
sider the work itself as the utterance of its author, Hermann Bote, we 
must conclude that the interpretation yielded by SAT conforms with 
what we know about the author’s political views. Till’s transgressions 
stand as a warning to the artisans: by violating traditional guild prac-
tices, they may bring about the destruction of their business. If the cor-
porative nexus is maintained, the parasitic Schalck will never be able 
to infect it. But a Derridian reading of the transgression sees parasit-
ism as a condition of all communication, so that no boundary, tradi-
tional or otherwise, can banish the infection. By demonstrating the 
susceptibility of “normal” discourse to parasitic, “non-serious” dis-
course, the text calls the necessity of the normal into question and ex-
poses it as mere convention, artifi ce. This is the fi rst step in envision-
ing a new order, a new set of conventions. Clearly this revolutionary 
interpretation lies beyond Bote’s intention, but its possibility lies, so 
a Derridian interpretation would argue, in the structural ambiguity of 
Till’s transgression. 
We fi nd this same ambiguity in the many scatological pranks in TE, 
where we fi nd the same tension between convention and non- conven-
tion at work. Let us consider by way of example the 77th episode, which
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relates Till’s stay at an inn in Nuremberg. Next door to the inn lives “ein 
frum man, der was reich und gieng gern in die Kirchen”,48 a staunch 
member of proper society who also wholeheartedly supports the social 
tabus directed against the dishonorable class. He “vermöcht sich nit wol 
der Spilleutt. Wa die waren oder kamen, da er was, da gieng er davon.”49 
This rich man had the custom of giving an annual dinner for his neigh-
bors, a sumptuous affair where food was lavish and the best wine 
fl owed freely. If the neighbors happened to have out-of-town guests — 
merchants and the like — these were invited along as well, as long as 
they, too, were “frum”, or honorable.50 One of these feasts takes place 
while Till is in town. Till’s innkeeper, a neighbor of the rich man, is in-
vited. Till, his guest, is not, because the rich man sees from Till’s dress 
that he is a “Gouckler und Spilman”,51 i.e., dishonorable. Till is insulted, 
but decides to behave in a manner appropriate to the designation given 
him: “Bin ich ein Gouckeler, so sol ich ihm Goucklerei beweisen.”52 He 
bores a hole through the wall of the rich man’s house and, equipped 
with a pile of his own fi lth (“seins Trecks ein grossen Huffen”53), blows 
the stench into the rich man’s dining hall with a bellows as all the
 
48. Dil Ulenspiegel, p. 221. 
49. Ibid., p. 221. 
50. “Und diser Man lud seinen Nachburen, als er für ein Gewonheit het, 
und ihr Gäst, die sie hetten von frumen Leüten.” (Ibid., p. 222.) It is interest-
ing to note that the rich man considered merchants suffi ciently honorable that 
he would invite them to his home. Bollenbeck (Till Eulenspiegel, p. 37-43) has 
noted that the traditional medieval prejudices against the merchant are muted 
in TE, because Bote, as a supporter of the Hanseatic cities, was relatively well-
disposed to those representing a livelihood so essential to the Hanseatic econ-
omy. For this reason one must qualify Bote’s “conservatism”, insofar as his 
urban perspective includes certain “progressive”, “bourgeois” aspects in distinc-
tion to the purely feudal interests of, say, the territorial princes. Bollenbeck’s 
differentiated analysis adds an important socio-historical dimension to earlier, 
fl atter ascriptions of “conservatism” to Hermann Bote. 
51. “Sunder Ulenspiegel lud er nit, den sahe er für ein Gouckler und 
Spilman,die pfl ag er nit zu laden.” (Dil Ulenspiegel, p. 222.) 
52. Ibid., p. 222. 
53. Ibid., p. 222. 
guests are eating. At fi rst everyone thinks the smell is coming from his 
neighbor. (This is an interesting comment, for it indicates that the smell 
is not essentially foreign to the illustrious crowd gathered there: even 
honorable people can smell bad.) As the odor becomes more power-
ful they search all corners of the room for its source. Finally the stench 
so overwhelms them that they are forced to leave the dinner. Here we 
see the results of Till’s transgression: it pollutes the “inside” such that it 
must be evacuated. Till’s innkeeper returns to his house, and after vom-
iting up his dinner (a more profound evacuation!), explains to Till how 
horrible the rich man’s room had smelled. Till laughs and says: 
Wolt mich der reich Man nit zu Gast laden und mir günnen seiner Kost? 
Ich bin ihm doch vil günstiger getrüwer wann er mir, ich gun ihm doch 
wol meiner Kost. Wär ich da gewesen, so hät es nit so ubel gestuncken.54 
Having insinuated his culpability in the prank, Till hightails it out of 
town. In his statement we see the same parasitic use of language as 
in the previous episode. The “Kost” Till so “generously and faithfully” 
grants the rich man is his own digested food, his excrement. According 
to SAT this parasitic use of language must be excluded from ordinary 
language, and we can see from the dialogue that follows that the rich 
man would also be glad to exclude Till from his presence: 
Der reich Man sprach: “Lieber Nachbuer, der Doren und Spillüt würt nie-
mant gebessert, darumb wil ich deren nit mer in meinem Huß haben. Ist 
mir nun dise Büberei also geschehen Euwers Huß halben, da kan ich nüt 
zu,ich sah Euwern Gast an für einen Schalck.55 
Till’s prank corresponds to the expectations the rich man has of the so-
cially declassed and reinforces his prejudice. He assumes an ontologi-
cal source for Till’s behavior: the prankster’s actions correspond to his 
being, and the social defi nition of Unehrlichkeit correctly identifi es this 
being. The only way to protect the “insiders”, the ehrliche Leute, from 
the effects of this Schalck is to banish him from the “inside”, from the 
“home”. 
But for the innkeeper, who is less well-off than the rich man, this is not
54. Ibid., p. 223. 
55. Ibid., p. 223. 
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possible. He is dependent on the patronage of all people, be they honor-
able or dishonorable. While he, too, makes the distinction between the 
two groups, it is relativized by his own economic need. Unable to ban 
the Schalck from his house, his only option is live with the anxiety and 
increase his watchfulness: 
Ulenspiegels Wirt sagt: “Lieber Wirt, Ihr haben wol gehört und ist auch 
also: für ein Schalck sol man zwei Liecht setzen, und das muß ich wol 
thun, dan ich muß allerlei halten. Einen Schalck muß man halten mit den 
Besten, so jemant kumpt.”56 
The innkeeper’s economic need effectively forces him to acknowledge 
the parasitic relationship of honorable and dishonorable, so that the 
presumed ontological divisions become shaky. This is still more the case 
when we consider Till’s assertion that, had he been invited to the din-
ner, had the tabu against his class been set aside, the prank would have 
been avoided. Seen from this perspective, Till’s prank refl ects not who 
he is, but how he is defi ned. As he himself says, his action is merely an 
example of the Goucklerei “proper” to the Gouckler-essence assigned 
him by the rich man. And his being defi ned as declassed outsider serves 
the important societal function of guaranteeing the existence of an in-
side, “normal” group. The initial description of the rich man clearly 
shows the mutual dependence of the positive and negative contours 
of his piety. Positive piety: “do wont ein frum Man, der was reich und 
gieng gern in die Kirchen”; negative piety: “und vermöcht sich nit wol 
der Spilleut. Wa die waren oder kamen, da er was, da gieng er davon.”57 
The prank inverts the relationship of inside to outside, thus relativiz-
ing the boundaries and exposing “proper” behavior as mere convention. 
This is the political possibility Derrida sees in parasitic or fi ctional dis-
course, the “literatures” or “revolutions” against the “language-police”. 
Moreover, the structure of iterability insists that the determination of 
positive values (in our episode: “frum” “ehrlich”, etc.) is merely an hy-
postatization of convention. As Derrida reminds us: 
The parasite is by defi nition never simply external, never simply some-
56. Ibid., p. 223 f. 
57. Ibid., p. 221. 
thing that can be excluded from or kept outside of the body “proper,” shut 
out from the “familial” table or house.58 
Again we can see how the two familiar interpretative possibilities would 
arise from this episode. If we follow the authorial intention as the “se-
rious” and legitimate meaning, we will conclude that Bote desired to 
show the drastic implications of transgression against “normal” so-
cial propriety, to encourage those able to banish the dishonorable from 
their home to do so, and to exhort those who could not to “light two 
candles”, i.e. be on their guard whenever they were forced to have deal-
ings with a Schalck. But if we legitimate non-serious language and fi nd 
serious meaning also in the parasitical “joke”, then we see that Till suc-
cessfully destabilizes conventional social norms. 
In this episode we also begin to see a point of mediation between the 
two interpretations in the fi gure of the innkeeper. The fi nancial rela-
tionship between Till and him relativizes the distinction between social 
insider and outcast. Critics have suggested that the frequently appear-
ing theme of money in TE refl ects the economic transition occurring in 
the late Middle Ages from an economy rooted in feudal bonds of obliga-
tion to a bourgeois market economy. Bote, it is argued, recognized the 
potential danger in this transition insofar as it tended to dissolve tradi-
tional corporative bonds.59 His recommendation in the face of this so-
cial disintegration comes through the innkeeper’s admonition — by way 
of a traditional proverb — to be careful. But the very fact that economic 
relationships can threaten the old social order, the very fact that cau-
tion must struggle to enforce the distinction between inside and out-
side, indicates that Bote recognizes the fragility of the traditional order. 
His anxiety arises as he considers that his society could be cutting itself 
adrift from its anchorage in what he believed was a divinely instituted 
order. 
This underlying anxiety seems to be able to account both for Bote’s 
intention to admonish, as well as the text’s structural ambiguity. His fear
58. Derrida: Limited Inc, p. 232. 
59. Wolfgang Fritz Haug: Die Einübung bürgerlicher Verkehrsformen bei 
Eulenspiegel. In: Eulenspiegel-Interpretationen, p. 201-224; Bollenbeck: Till 
Eulenspiegel, esp. p. 29-32, 100-109. 
26 Priscilla Hayden-Roy in Daphnis 20 (1991) Till Eulenspiegel’s Transgressions Against Convention 27
that all societal norms are violable begins to undermine his intention 
to exhort, because there seems to be no position immune from the at-
tacks of parasitism. The retributive function of many of the episodes — 
such as the two discussed above — suggests that if social norms are up-
held, society will secure itself from Till’s transgressions. This has led 
several critics to argue that the proper theme of the chapbook is not 
the fi gure of Till at all, but the perverseness of the world (die Verkehrt-
heit der Welt).60 The theme of the “world upside-down” was pervasive 
in the sixteenth century, and was often utilized for its polemical force. 
Erasmus places Scholastic theology in the domain of Folly, implicitly 
defending the role of humanistic scholarship; Reformation propaganda 
places the papal tiara on the Whore of Babylon, implicitly giving an 
apology for the new, evangelical theology.61  To a large extent we can 
see the motif of the world upside-down similarly employed in service of 
Bote’s social concerns: Till’s pranks negate an already existing negation 
of what Bote perceives to be the “normal” order. But this model does 
not account for those episodes where Till’s transgression is entirely un-
provoked and does not serve to negate any vice. Here Bote seems to be 
considering that even proper, traditional behavior is unable to protect 
society from the force of disintegration as embodied in Till. In such ep-
isodes Bote cannot exhort his reader, and the model of the perversity of 
the world cannot provide an adequate interpretation. Exhortation can-
not cure Bote’s anxiety in the instances where there is no immune posi-
tion that he can recommend to his reader. 
60. Based on his discovery of Bote as the author, Peter Honegger was the 
fi rst to ask, “ob das, was uns der Verfasser des Volksbuches von seinem Hel-
den erzählt, als thematisch geschickt geordnete Nachricht über einen historisch 
nachweisbaren Till Eulenspiegel gemeint ist, oder ob nicht vielmehr der Ulen-
spiegel vor allem das wiedergibt, was sich der Verfasser über seine Umwelt ge-
dacht hat. Es scheint, daß er uns mit einer genialen Satire über die Anmaßung 
und Dummheit seiner Mitmenschen unterhalten will.” (Honegger: Ulenspiegel, 
p. 126 f.) Alexander Schwarz (Verkehrte Welt im Ulenspiegel. In: Daphnis 15 
[1986], p. 441-461) argues more stringently that the proper theme of TE is not 
Till, but the perversity of the world. 
61. See R.W. Scribner: For the Sake of Simple Folk. Popular Propaganda for 
the German Reformation. Cambridge 1981, p. 164 f. 
Consider the 88th episode, where a peasant fi nds Till lying under a 
tree, sick from having overimbibed and “einem todten Menschen glei-
cher dan einem lebendigen”.62 To the peasant passing by, market-
bound, with a cart full of plums, Till moans: 
Ach, gut Fründ, sich, hie bin ich so kranck drei Tag und Nacht on aller 
Menschen Hilff hie gelegen, und wa ich noch einen Tag also ligen sol, so 
möcht ich wol Hunger und Durst sterben. Darumb für mich umb Gots 
willen für die Stat.63 
Seeing Till’s poor condition and fi guring he would have to lie in his 
cart, the peasant at fi rst refuses Till’s request, saying he would ruin his 
plums. But Till insists he can ride on the front of the cart, so the peas-
ant, a “frum Man”,64 plays the role of good Samaritan and helps Till 
onto the cart. The story notes that the man was old, and it cost him con-
siderable pain lifting Till. And he drove the cart slowly, to make his ail-
ing guest more comfortable along the way. His reward? Till defecates 
on his plums, rendering them unmarketable. 
It is unlikely that sixteenth-century readers, steeped as they were in 
the Bible, would fail to hear an allusion to the gospel account of the good 
Samaritan in this episode. But with what a peculiar twist! The peasant, 
initially torn between behaving according to his economic interests or 
to a traditional morality, decides for the latter, only to be “punished” 
for it. This episode demonstrates how deep-seated the anxieties gener-
ated by the increasingly shaky foundations of traditional society were. 
It penetrates even to the foundations of moral and charitable behav-
ior; even they are not inviolable. Surely this was an unhappy conclusion 
for someone with Bote’s moral convictions, and it begins to undermine 
his exhortatory intention in the chapbook. The transgressions in TE are 
not always fi xed to a program of reform. Their shifting locus becomes 
symptomatic of a pervasive anxiety in the face of relativized or disinte-
grating “givens”. 
62. Dil Ulenspiegel, p. 251. 
63. Ibid., p. 251 f. 
64. Ibid., p. 251. 
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Summary 
Till is the projection of anxieties arising in the face of social instability. 
Bote, who was witness to just how fragile the given order of patrician 
rule in Brunswick was, was sensible both to its weaknesses and to its 
preferability to disorder. The shifting locus of perverseness in TE pro-
vides an adequate structure for Bote, who is critical of his society, but 
uneasy about the forces threatening to tear it apart altogether. The vi-
olability of the order is so profound, that at times there seems to be no 
position which can be defended against parasitic infection. Bote’s ad-
monitory intention thus begins to turn in on itself, and the chapbook 
assumes a highly ambiguous character. While vice clearly invites dis-
order, it seems that virtue, too, is subject to parasitic infection. No be-
havior, no place is immune. Till’s transgressions relativize the given or-
der from top to bottom, inside to out. It is impossible to distill from the 
chapbook’s many episodes a consistent lesson or moral, because of the 
constantly shifting locus of perversity. 
Derrida’s understanding of iterability and parasitic language pro-
vides us with a useful heuristic device in defi ning ambiguity as a struc-
tural principle in the chapbook. It allows the work to vacillate between 
serious and non-serious language, between history and fi ction. Inter-
preting according to authorial intention alone (SAT) fl attens the work 
by identifying only Bote’s admonitory voice, while overlooking how his 
anxiety tends to undermine the very norms he intends to uphold. How-
ever there are limits to this heuristic device. Derrida’s polemic against 
Searle is part of a larger philosophical project criticizing certain ten-
dencies within the Western philosophical tradition. He posits struc-
tural ambiguity as the condition of all discourse. But I have employed 
Derrida outside of this philosophical context. The structural ambiguity 
we have discussed in TE is not a function of the text’s textuality. It is a 
function of this specifi c text: its genre, its author, its historical context. 
The book vacillates between fi ctionality and historicity by design. As 
the author writes in the foreword, the book consists of “Historien und 
Geschichten”.65 Claims to the hero’s historicity — dates, specifi c places
65. Ibid., p. 7. 
where Till was born, lived, and died, even an alleged gravestone — are 
undermined by the willfully interjected anachronisms throughout the 
narrative,66  and by the author’s acknowledgement that he included 
material from other Schwänke. He even encourages his readers to add 
their own tales to the collection.67 Derrida’s observation that “at the ‘or-
igin’ of every speech act there can only be Societies which are (more or 
less) anonymous, with limited responsibility or liability”68 also helps us 
identify Bote’s deferral of authorial intention in TE. But this deferral is 
not the Derridian deferral endemic to all writing. It is a literary conven-
tion with a specifi c historical function. We have seen that the volatile 
social conditions in Brunswick may well have led Bote to defer his au-
thorial liability to a “Society” (etlich Personen) in order to protect him-
self. Bote’s deferral of authorial intention also raises more far-reaching 
questions concerning the emergence of the early modern author as a 
subject in the early sixteenth century.69 The vacillation in TE between 
“serious” and “non-serious” language is also specifi c to the work: the au-
thor employs citations out of context, or parasitic language, intention-
ally for its humorous effect. Derrida again gives us tools to identify this, 
to do interpretive justice to more than a single, “serious” meaning. But 
this vacillation, too, has a specifi c historical locus. Studies have touched 
on the problem of “komischer Gehalt” and “gehaltvolle Komik” in TE, 
casting it in terms of the contem- porary understanding of the relation-
ship between ars iocandi and ars vivendi.70 It was believed that comical 
66. Honegger: Ulenspiegel, p. 127-129. 
67. Bote writes in the foreword that he included “etliche() Fabulen des Pfaff 
Amis und des Pfaffen von dem Kalenberg”; he suggests that readers and listen-
ers “gute kurtzweilige Fröden und Schwänck daruß fabulleren.” (Dil Ulenspie-
gel, p. 7 f.) 
68. Derrida: Limited Inc, p. 216. 
69. Peter Seibert: Der ‘tichter’ und ‘poeta’ am Beginn der Neuzeit. Einige Be-
merkungen zum frühreformatorischen Autorentypus. In: LiLi. Zeitschrift für 
Litdraturwissenschaft und Linguistik 11 (1981), No. 42, pp. 13-28. 
70. Bollenbeck: Till Eulenspiegel, p. 187 f.; Heinz-Günter Schmitz: Physiol-
ogie des Scherzes. Bedeutung und Rechtfertigung der Ars Iocandi im 16. Jahr-
hundert. Hildesheim, NY 1972. 
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literature served the revivifying function of replenishing humors dried 
out by excessive worry. Works such as TE could drive away melancholy; 
Luther himself recommended TE as a means of avoiding the devil’s An-
fechtungen.71 In his foreword Bote suggests this medicinal purpose lies 
at the heart of the book, which he wrote, he says, “umb ein frölich Ge-
müt zu machen in schweren Zeiten”.72  The philosophical context of de-
constructive parasitism as it is employed against the intellectual con-
straints of “logocentrism”, tends to valorize the disruptive potential of 
iterability. It fi nds in the transgressions against the “language police” 
emancipatory “’revolutions’ that as yet have no model”. 73 We found that 
Till’s parasitic language mirrors the instability of the social order of the 
late medieval period. Bote intended to hold this mirror up as a warn-
ing, but it also refl ects his uneasiness vis-à-vis the fragility, violability 
and changeability of the order. While later readers would valorize this 
potential, making Till into a positive hero, the historical context lim-
its the parameters even of Bote’s non-intentional message. This mes-
sage — that the order is violable — is a fearsome possibility in the early 
sixteenth century, quite lacking the “Byronic chic”74 it possesses today. 
Derrida helps us get at this non-intentional message by showing the lim-
its of authorial intention as an interpretive tool, and offering an alter-
native model of structural ambivalence. The heuristic device by which 
we could avoid an interpretation overly-determined by context brings 
us to a non-intentional meaning which itself is specifi c to the work’s 
historical context. If we wish to understand the signifi cance of Till’s 
transgressions in the early sixteenth century, we must conclude that 
71. “Die beste Arznei wieder die Anfechtung ist, daß du deine Gedanken 
davon abwendest, das ist, redest von anderen Dingen, von Markofolo, Eulen-
spiegel und dergleichen lächerlichen Possen, so sich gar zu solchen Handeln 
weder reimen noch dienen.” (Martin Luther, WA TR Vol. 1, No. 1089; cited by 
Bollenbeck: Till Eulenspiegel, p. 315; and by Schmitz: Physiologie des Scher-
zes, p. 4.) 
72. Dil Ulenspiegel, p. 7. See Schmitz: Physiologie des Scherzes, p. 82. 
73. Derrida: Limited Inc, p. 243. 
74. The phrase was coined by Denis Donoghue: Deconstructing Deconstruc-
tion. In: New York Review of Books 27 (1980), No. 10, p. 41. 
they were not revolutionary, but rather symptomatic of the anxiety 
caused by a fearsome disintegration of traditional corporative bonds. 
Of course this does not invalidate later interpretations of Till that valo-
rize (or trivialize, as in children’s literature) his transgressions. The it-
erability of the text opens diachronically to a multiplicity of meanings 
as the interpretive context shifts. But these, too, are to be understood in 
their historical specifi city.
